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We study the impact of anticipated fiscal policy changes in the Ramsey econ-
omy when agents form expectations using adaptive learning. We extend the
existing framework by distortionary taxes as well as elastic labour supply, which
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1. Motivation
Nowadays, fiscal policy is usually accompanied by legislation and implementa-
tion lags. These lags create a non-negligible span of time between the announce-
ment and effective date of a fiscal policy change. This gives individuals in the
economy the opportunity to anticipate the tax changes. The economic literature
denotes this aspect of fiscal policy either anticipated fiscal policy or fiscal fore-
sight. From our reading, those two terms are equivalents and will be used as
such.1
When agents anticipate, their resulting actions may to some extent depend
on the way they form expectations about the future. The standard assumption
of expectations in economics is perfect-foresight / rational expectations (RE).
This assumption might be questioned. One prominent deviation of RE that
imposes weaker requirements on the agent’s information set when making his
decisions, is the learning literature (see Evans and Honkapohja (2001) for the
foundations of this approach). The main idea is that agents form expectations
about future values of variables they cannot observe by engaging in a kind of
statistical inference when making their economic choices.
Although the learning approach has gained significant popularity in some
areas of macroeconomics, anticipated fiscal policy has, until recently, been ne-
glected. A pioneering contribution to the study of the consequences of antici-
pated fiscal policy when agents learn factor prices, has been made by Evans et al.
(2009). They demonstrate the adaptive constant gain learning approach in sev-
eral deterministic economic environments, taking changes in lump-sum taxation
1Recently Leeper (2009, p.11ff.) has listed empirical evidence for fiscal foresight and reem-
phasized the relevance of expectations for sound fiscal policy. Furthermore, Leeper et al. (2009)
is another good example of empirical evidence of fiscal foresight. Therein they also demonstrate
the challenges for econometricians that aim to quantify the impact of fiscal policy actions and
at the same time account adequately for fiscal foresight.
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as an example. The choice of a constant gain therein is motivated by the fact
that fiscal policy moves may state structural change. First Evans et al. (2009,
p.932ff.) consider permanent, temporary and repeated tax changes in an endow-
ment economy with a balanced-budget policy. The core message of their results
is that under learning, anticipated fiscal policy changes have instant effects on
key variables as in the perfect foresight case, but the transition paths are remark-
ably different from the latter. This result, at least with regard to the volatility
of key variables’ time paths may not come as a surprise. It is well known that
constant gain learning causes excess volatility compared to the case of RE (see
Evans and Honkapohja (2001, p.49) for an illustration). Thereafter, Evans et al.
(2009, p.941ff.) turn attention to the scenario of debt financing of anticipated
fiscal policy changes and find that, given agents understand the structure of gov-
ernment financing but have to forecast factor-prices on decentralized markets,
the so-called “near Ricardian equivalence” holds under learning. Finally, Evans
et al. (2009, p.943ff.) introduce the adaptive learning approach to the basic Ram-
sey model. For an anticipated balanced-budget permanent tax change they once
more confirm that under learning the time paths of key variables are strikingly
different from their perfect foresight counterparts.
In subsequent work, Evans et al. (2010) focus on Ricardian equivalence in
the basic Ramsey model with anticipated fiscal policy under learning. Most
important, Evans et al. (2010, p.8ff.) formally proof that the assumption of RE
is not necessary for the classic Ricardian equivalence result. Furthermore, Evans
et al. (2010, p.10ff.) provide new departures from the Ricardian equivalence
proposition. First, if government expenditures are endogenous, i.e. depend on
a fiscal rule, then Ricardian equivalence holds only under RE but fails under
learning. Second, Ricardian equivalence breaks down, if the expected interest
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rates depend on changes in the level of public debt.
Building on the contribution of Evans et al. (2009), we aim to generalize their
analysis of anticipated fiscal policy under learning into an economy featuring
distortionary taxes and elastic labour supply. Thus, our theoretical key contri-
bution is to derive the dynamic paths of key variables for permanent changes in
distortionary taxes in a deterministic version of the prominent Ramsey model.
In addition, our second key contribution is to numerically examine fiscal policy
reforms, in the presence of several tax instruments.
Note that there are fundamental differences between lump-sum taxation and
distortionary taxation: a labour income tax under inelastic labour supply does
not affect household margins and therefore causes no distortion, but under elastic
labour supply the labour income tax affects the intra-temporal choice between
consumption and leisure of the household and may cause an intra-temporal dis-
tortion. Next, a capital income tax has the potential to cause up to two types
of distortion. First, the capital income tax in any case affects the inter-temporal
household Euler equation. In case of elastic labour supply, the capital income
tax also affects the intra-temporal choice between consumption and leisure of the
household due to its distortion of the consumption choice. Finally, a consump-
tion tax may also cause an inter-temporal distortion by affecting the household
Euler equation, but there is an important difference compared to capital income
taxation. The consumption tax affects the price of consumption in both periods
considered in the household Euler equation whereas the capital income tax al-
ways affects only the price of next period’s consumption in the household Euler
equation. Loosely speaking, a consumption tax can distort consumption and in-
vestment decision via the household’s Euler equation, only when it is changed,
i.e. time-varying, whereas a capital income tax always causes distortions in the
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Ramsey economy. Thus, we may expect that the dynamics of the economy for
a capital income tax reform may be fundamentally different from the economic
dynamics for a consumption tax reform.2
Furthermore, the assumption of elastic labour supply implies that endogenous
variables such as factor prices as well as employment and consumption are not
predetermined as in Evans et al. (2009, p.943ff.) or in Evans et al. (2010), but
determined simultaneously in each period.
Next to the analytical derivations, we also calibrate our model and calculate
welfare consequences for several policy experiments under perfect foresight as well
as under learning. For this purpose, we make use of the welfare measure proposed
by Lucas (1990) and also applied by Cooley and Hansen (1992) (for discrete time),
which takes into account the whole transition path between the initial and new
steady-states associated with initial and changed tax rates. Thus, putting it
differently, we ask, to what extent the excess volatility caused by constant gain
learning affects the well-being of households compared to the perfect foresight
case. Using such a measure of welfare consequences, may even allow comparison
of results for learning dynamics to previous studies such as Lucas (1990), Cooley
and Hansen (1992) or Garcia-Mila` et al. (2010). All these studies evaluate and
rank various distortionary tax reforms according to their welfare consequences
under perfect foresight, but do not consider the case of learning.
Our main results are as follows. When we assume that agents use adaptive
learning rules to forecast factor prices, our model predicts oscillatory dynamic
responses to anticipated permanent tax changes. The source of the oscillations
are expectational errors. In addition, policy experiments indicate that these
2Note that a consumption tax may also be a desirable subject of study, as it has special
stability properties. See Giannitsarou (2007) for the details.
4
volatile responses may have a major impact on the welfare consequences of tax
reforms. In particular we consider experiments that improve welfare but do so to
a much lower extent under learning compared to perfect foresight.
Note that our approach links the learning literature to that part of the public
finance literature that is concerned with the welfare consequences of different
types of taxation. See Chamley (1981) for an example of a comparative statics
analysis or Judd (1987) for differences in unanticipated and anticipated changes
in factor taxes. In addition, there have been studies in stochastic set-ups, like
Cooley and Hansen (1992). With regard to the implementation of anticipated
optimal fiscal policy an example is Domeij and Klein (2005) or its extension
for public goods and capital by Trabandt (2007). Moreover, Garcia-Mila` et al.
(2010) have recently conducted research on welfare consequences of fiscal policy
experiments in the spirit of Cooley and Hansen (1992) in a heterogeneous agents
model.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we outline the
economic model, derive optimality conditions and detail our approach of learning.
Section 3 compares the dynamics with and without elastic labour supply for the
case of lump-sum tax changes. This section also provides sensitivity analysis for
some structural parameters. In Section 4 we consider changes in distortionary
taxation and present a numerical welfare analysis of selected policy experiments.
Section 5 concludes and points out directions for further research.
2. The Model
Our economy is a version of the Ramsey economy outlined in detail in Ljungqvist
and Sargent (2000, p.305ff.). The capital stock kt evolves according to the
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economy-wide resource constraint
kt+1 = F (kt, nt)− ct − gt + (1− δ)kt, (1)
where F (kt, nt) is the economy’s production function (equalling output) showing
that the firm sector uses capital kt and labour nt as inputs to produce the single
good of the economy (see Section 2.2 for the details). Output can either be
consumed by households (ct) or the government (gt) or added to the capital
stock. Capital is assumed to depreciate at a constant rate δ.
2.1. Households
With regard to the household sector, we assume a continuum of households,
where we normalize the size of the economy to unity and each household faces
the problem
max
ct,nt
E∗t
{ ∞∑
t=0
βt
[
log(ct) + η log(L¯− nt)
]}
(2)
s.t.
kt+1 +
bt+1
Rt
+ (1 + τ ct )ct = (1− τ lt )wtnt + (1− τ kt )rtkt + (1− δ)kt
+bt − τt + pit, (3)
where all variables are in per capita terms. Thus, the variable kt+1 denotes the
stock of capital in period t+ 1 and bt+1 is the level of government debt holdings
chosen in period t. Furthermore, rt is the rental rate of capital and Rt is the
gross real interest rate in period t. The level of consumption chosen in period t
is indicated by ct. Next, τ
•
t denotes a distortionary tax either on consumption,
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labour income or capital income3. The real wage in period t is given by wt and
lt = L¯−nt denotes leisure. In consequence, nt is labour supply of the household.
τt is a per capita lump-sum tax and pit = 0 is the profit under perfect competition
among firms. Furthermore, the parameter η ≥ 0 measures the elasticity of labour
supply and the parameter β is the common discount rate.
E∗t {•} denotes subjective period t expectations for future values of variables.
Households apply this operator, if they do not have perfect foresight.4 This as-
sumption is commonly used in the learning literature. Furthermore, note that we
abstract from aggregate uncertainty, i.e. we conduct our analysis in a determinis-
tic economy. Thus, if households do not have perfect foresight, their expectations
are so-called point expectations, i.e. agents base their economic choices on the
mean of their expectations, see Evans and Honkapohja (2001, p.61). In Sec-
tion 2.4 below we outline our concept of learning. An important aspect of this
concept is that forecasts of single variables are independent of each other. In
consequence, we can assume that for any two variables X and Y it is true that
E∗t {XY } = E∗t {X}E∗t {Y } holds.
Now, we detail the household’s decisions. Each household solves the La-
grangian
L = E∗t
∞∑
t=0
βt{log(ct) + η log(L¯− nt)
−λt[kt+1 + bt+1
Rt
+ (1 + τ ct )ct − (1− τ lt )wtnt − (1− τ kt )rtkt − (1− δ)kt
−bt + τt]}
3We use the symbol • as a placeholder throughout our analysis.
4Recall that under perfect foresight agents fix their current and future choices once and for
all. This will no longer be the case under the assumption of learning, as we outline in what
follows.
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with first-order conditions
∂L
∂ct
: βt
{
c−1t − λt(1 + τ ct )
} !
= 0 (4)
∂L
∂kt+1
: βt {−λt}+ βt+1E∗t
{
λt+1
[
(1− δ) + (1− τ kt+1)rt+1
]} !
= 0 (5)
∂L
∂bt+1
: βt
{−λtR−1t }+ βt+1E∗t {λt+1} != 0 (6)
∂L
∂nt
: βt
{−η(L¯− nt)−1 − λt[−(1− τ lt )wt]} != 0. (7)
From (4) and (6) we get the household Euler condition
c−1t = βRtE
∗
t
{
c−1t+1
(1 + τ ct )
(1 + τ ct+1)
}
, (8)
(5) and (6) yield the no-arbitrage condition for capital and bonds
Rt =
[
(1− δ) + (1− E∗t
{
τ kt+1
}
)E∗t {rt+1}
]
, (9)
and from (4) and (7) we get the consumption leisure trade-off
nt = L¯− η(1 + τ
c
t )ct
(1− τ lt )wt
. (10)
2.2. Firms
In our economy, there is a unit continuum of firms who compete perfectly.
Each firm in each period t rents capital at given price rt and labour at given price
wt and produces the numeraire good with constant returns to scale production
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function
yt = F (kt, nt) = Ak
α
t n
(1−α)
t (11)
where α ∈ (0, 1). The optimal firm behaviour requires that
rt
!
=
∂yt
∂kt
= Aαkα−1t n
1−α
t , (12)
as well as
wt
!
=
∂yt
∂nt
= A(1− α)kαt n−αt , (13)
i.e. each production factor earns its marginal product. Finally, we have the per
capita national income identity
yt = rtkt + wtnt,
pit = yt − rtkt − wtnt = 0, (14)
which means zero profits, as one can expect from perfect competition.
2.3. Government
The government finances its expenses on goods and debt repayment by tax
revenues and the issuance of new bonds in each period t
gt + bt = τ
c
t ct + τ
l
twtnt + τ
k
t rtkt + τt +
bt+1
Rt
.
For the remainder, we will assume that the government operates a balanced-
budget rule in each period t, thus tax revenues will fully cover expenses such that
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bonds are in zero net supply as a direct consequence. Thus the government sets
gt, τ
c
t , τ
l
t , τ
k
t and τt constrained by
gt = τ
c
t ct + τ
l
twtnt + τ
k
t rtkt + τt (15)
in each period t.
2.4. Learning
Now, we aim to detail our concept of learning that was elaborated in Evans
et al. (2009, p.943ff.). For completeness we restate the crucial assumptions on
learning. Under learning, households are supposed to know the entire history of
endogenous variables. They observe the current period value of exogenous vari-
ables and they know the state variables. Furthermore, they know the structure
of the economy with regard to the fiscal policy sector. Agents understand the im-
plications of the announced policy change for the government budget constraint.
They are also convinced that the intertemporal government budget constraint
will always hold (see Evans et al. (2009, p.944)). It is decentralized markets for
labour and capital, where agents are not in possession of perfect foresight. Ac-
tual factor prices are not observable. Thus, agents forecast factor prices such as
interest rates and wages ret+j(t), w
e
t+j(t), j ≥ 1, by making use of constant-gain
steady-state adaptive learning rules5
ret+j(t) = r
e(t) and wet+j(t) = w
e(t), (16)
5Here we apply the same short-hand notation as Evans et al. (2009). Thus for any variable
say z, its period t expected future value in period t + j derived by a learning rule may either
be denoted E∗t {zt+j} or equivalently zet+j(t). An additional notation we introduce is zpt+j(t)
which denotes the agent’s planned choice of the variable z in period t + j based on expected
values formed via the learning rule in period t.
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where
re(t) = re(t− 1) + γ(rt−1 − re(t− 1))
(17)
we(t) = we(t− 1) + γ(wt−1 − we(t− 1)),
where 0 < γ ≤ 1 is the gain parameter.6 Our choice of this specific learning rule is
motivated by two well known arguments in the learning literature. First, as Evans
and Honkapohja (2001, p.332) outline, choosing a constant gain learning rule is
the appropriate choice for agents, when they are aware of structural change, as in
such a learning rule agents discount past data exponentially. Note that rules (17)
are equivalent to re(t) = γ
∑∞
i=0(1−γ)irt−i−1 and we(t) = γ
∑∞
i=0(1−γ)iwt−i−1.7
Second, the timing of the learning rule, i.e. that agents’ update in period t uses
data up to period t−1, is chosen in order to avoid simultaneity between re(t) and
rt as well as w
e(t) and wt (see for example Evans and Honkapohja (2001, p.51)).
Think of simultaneity in this context as a situation in which agents’ expectations
affect current values of aggregate endogenous variables and vice versa, which may
potentially introduce some strategic behaviour.
Such a learning rule yields a sequence of so-called temporary equilibria, which
consist of sequences of (planned) time paths for all endogenous variables. These
sequences satisfy the learning rule above, the expectation history, household and
firm optimality conditions, the government budget constraint and the economy-
6The gain parameter measures the responsiveness of the forecast to new observations, see
Evans and Honkapohja (2001, p.18). Be aware that in our model the gain parameter is ex-
ogenous. See Branch and Evans (2007) for a recent example where agents can choose the gain
parameter.
7Time series analysts may recognize that the learning rules are similar to a exponential
smoothing method.
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wide resource constraint given the exogenous variables as well as the current stock
of capital in each period. These plans are revisited and potentially altered in each
period after expectations have been updated.
3. Base Case: Lump-Sum Tax
Before pursuing our core issue, i.e. the case of distortionary taxation, we
would like to illustrate the applied methodology for the case of lump-sum taxation
for two reasons: first, we want to illustrate the consequences of the introduction of
elastic labour supply compared to the case of inelastic labour supply as assumed
in Evans et al. (2009, p.943ff.) and its effect on the dynamic paths of the key
variables such as consumption and capital, given their calibration (see Table 1
below); second, below in Subsection 3.2, we aim to present a sensitivity analysis
for the very basic version of the model under examination.
Let us now derive the dynamic paths under learning for an anticipated lump-
sum tax change. Consequently we assume all other types of taxation away, i.e.
τ ct = τ
l
t = τ
k
t = 0. The Euler equation (8) is standard
c−1t = β(c
p
t+1(t))
−1 [(1− δ) + ret+1(t)]
and forward substitution of this yields
cpt+j(t) = β
jDet,t+j(t)ct, (18)
where we define Det,t+j(t) ≡ Πji=1[(1− δ) + ret+i(t)]. One can think of this term as
“expectations of the interest rate factor Dt,t+j at time t” (see Evans et al. (2009,
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p.933)). Next, we notice that the consumption leisure trade-off in this case is
nt = L¯− ηct
wt
. (19)
Given the adequate transversality condition for capital8
lim
T 7→∞
(
Det,t+T (t)
)−1
kpt+T+1(t) = 0, (20)
the inter-temporal budget constraint of the consumer is
ct +
∞∑
j=1
1
Det,t+j(t)
cpt+j(t) = [(1− δ) + rt]kt + wtnt − τt
+
∞∑
j=1
1
Det,t+j(t)
[
wet+j(t)n
p
t+j(t)− τ et+j(t)
]
,
which by the virtue of (18) and (19) yields
ct
(1 + η)
(1− β) = [(1− δ) + rt]kt + wtL¯− τt
+
∞∑
j=1
1
Det,t+j(t)
wet+j(t)L¯︸ ︷︷ ︸
≡SW1
−
∞∑
j=1
1
Det,t+j(t)
τ et+j(t)︸ ︷︷ ︸
≡ST1
. (21)
Equations (12) and (13) hold for firms. Finally, government faces the constraint
gt = τt (22)
in each period t and the economy-wide resource constraint is given by (1).
We now need to think about the policy experiment we will study. We are
looking at a scenario of a credible permanent change in taxes announced at the
8Note that agents plan to satisfy this condition.
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outset of period t = 1 and effective from period t = Tp onwards. In particular a
tax change from τ0 to τ1 at some point in time Tp. The dynamics under perfect
foresight are standard.9 Under learning we can directly follow Evans et al. (2009,
p.943ff.). The crucial step is to calculate the infinite sums on the right-hand side
of (21), i.e. SW1 and ST1. Directly following the appendix in Evans et al. (2009,
p.951ff.) we calculate
SW1 =
we(t)L¯
re(t)− δ . (23)
With regard to ST1, we have
10
ST1 =
τ0
re(t)− δ + (τ1 − τ0)
[(1− δ) + re(t)]t−Tp
1− [(1− δ) + re(t)]−1 (24)
for 1 ≤ t < Tp and
ST1 =
τ1
re(t)− δ . (25)
for t ≥ Tp. From (21) follows that we have
ct =
(1− β)
(1 + η)
{[(1− δ) + rt]kt + wtL¯− τ0 + w
e(t)L¯
re(t)− δ
− τ0
re(t)− δ − (τ1 − τ0)
[(1− δ) + re(t)]t−Tp
1− [(1− δ) + re(t)]−1} (26)
9Ljungqvist and Sargent (2000, p.305ff.) illustrate the analytical derivations and numerical
simulation alternatives for the perfect foresight case. We will simply make use of the DYNARE
toolbox throughout all calculations to compute dynamics under perfect foresight. Note that
this toolbox employs linearization methods.
10See Appendix A.2 for details on derivations and Appendix A.1 for an illustration of the
timing, which is relevant for all derivations.
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for 1 ≤ t < Tp and
ct =
(1− β)
(1 + η)
[
[(1− δ) + rt]kt + wtL¯− τ1 + w
e(t)L¯
re(t)− δ −
τ1
re(t)− δ
]
(27)
for t ≥ Tp. Given a calibration, we can then compute the dynamics of consump-
tion and other endogenous variables.
3.1. Inelastic Labour Supply vs. Elastic Labour Supply
We believe that it is of importance to use a model that features elastic labour
supply in order to calculate welfare implications of fiscal policy reforms ade-
quately. Completely inelastic labour supply is a quite unrealistic assumption
itself and at least some moderately elastic labour supply should be considered.
Moreover, inelastic labour supply implies that agents’ choices of current period
endogenous variables are in fact predetermined as is pointed out in Evans et al.
(2009, p.944). In order to illustrate differences in the dynamics of endogenous
variables based on the assumption of inelastic and elastic labour supply, we
return to the simulation exercise of Evans et al. (2009, p.943ff.). Note that
τ ct = τ
l
t = τ
k
t = δ = 0 and η = 0 imply that nt = L¯ (i.e. inelastic labour supply)
for all t (see equation (19)). Therefore, we are exactly in the same scenario as in
Evans et al. (2009, p.943ff.). Although we do not fully agree with the calibration
of Evans et al. (2009), we will stick to their calibration in this subsection to keep
our results comparable. We will indicate, when we deviate from their calibration
later on. The basic reason for this disagreement is the combination of parame-
ters β = 0.95 and Tp = 20. These parameter choices imply that a government,
which in reality is usually in charge of a legislation period of four to six years,
may announce a tax policy change that will be effective in 20 years’ time. From
our perception of political execution and our confidence in fiscal policy makers’
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ability to commit, this appears to be unrealistic in most cases.
For the moment, we calibrate the model according to Table 1 below.
Insert Table 1 here.
The policy experiment considered in Evans et al. (2009, p.943ff.) is a per-
manent increase in government purchases from g0 = τ0 = 0.9 to g1 = τ1 = 1.1
that is announced credibly in period t = 1 and will be effective from period
Tp = 20 onwards. It is assumed that the economy is in steady-state in period
t = 0. Simulations in Evans et al. (2009, p.943ff.) for consumption and capital
are recalculated (with η = 0, L¯ = 0.5182) and displayed in Figures 1(a) and 1(b)
below. Furthermore, Figures 1(c) and 1(d) exhibit the dynamics for elastic labour
supply with η = 2.00 and L¯ = 1.00, values that match n0 = 0.5182 and g0 = 0.9
in this set-up.11
Two distinct features emerge from Figure 1. First, when we compare the
dynamic paths of consumption (as well as capital) under perfect foresight and
learning, they are different from each other no matter with or without elastic
labour supply. Therefore, it may be quite important to consider learning when
evaluating fiscal policies as learning is a more realistic assumption of human
behaviour from our point of view.12 Second, obviously the learning paths in
Figures 1(a) and 1(b) for inelastic labour supply are strikingly different to the
ones under elastic labour supply in Figures 1(c) and 1(d). In particular, elastic
labour supply yields much more volatility in the time paths of consumption and
11Note that n0 = 0.5182 corresponds to 12.44 hours per day. This appears to be quite
unrealistic, but we choose those numbers in order to achieve comparable magnitudes in Figure
1 below.
12This is the core message of Evans et al. (2009).
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Figure 1: Consumption (a) and capital (b) dynamics under learning (solid curve)
and perfect foresight (dashed curve) with inelastic labour supply as in
Evans et al. (2009, p.943ff.) as well as consumption (c) and capital (d)
dynamics under learning (solid curve) and perfect foresight (dashed
curve) with elastic labour supply. The dotted horizontal line indicates
the (new) steady state, the dotted vertical line indicates period Tp.
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capital (as well as other variables in the model) compared to the inelastic labour
supply case. In fact, the variables oscillate around their steady-state until they
converge to it.
In our opinion, the reason for the significant differences in the dynamics under
learning between elastic and inelastic labour supply can be explained by consid-
ering the initial responses of variables to the anticipated policy change and its
consequences for the expectations formation process of agents in turn.
In Figure 1 the decline of current wealth due to an anticipated higher lump-
sum tax rate from date Tp onwards causes households to save more instantly
which results in an initial drop in consumption, which can be seen from (26).
Given elastic labour supply, this drop in consumption leads to a rise of labour
supply via (10). As the stock of capital is predetermined and cannot respond
instantly, the increase of labour supply clearly implies a rise in the rental rate
of capital and a fall in the real wage via (12)-(13). The capital stock in the
subsequent period will be larger due to (1).
Note that under learning the expectations about factor prices as specified in
(16)-(17) do not initially respond. This causes a difference between the factor
price and its expectation, i.e. an expectational error. Exactly this error triggers
the oscillating learning process that starts in the subsequent period.
Next, consider the algebra of the learning rule (16)-(17). Although, expecta-
tions of factor prices may hit the new steady-state value, the agent simply does
not realize that it is the new steady-state value. Furthermore, the learning rule
(16)-(17) forces the agent to update expectations in each period and the second
term in the learning rule (16)-(17) will not be zero. Put differently, there is
some persistence of expectational errors. Therefore, if expectations of a factor
price used to be above (below) the new steady-state, then after hitting the new
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steady-state, the expectations will be below (above) the new steady-state until
the learning rule (16)-(17) again forces the expectations to hit the new steady-
state. Note that when the expectations of a factor price hit the new steady-state
from above (below) they do so because the actual value of this factor price must
be below (above) the new steady-state at this moment. Thus, unlike in the per-
fect foresight case, the expectations of a factor price cannot stop evolving when
they reach the steady state. In sum, the persistence of expectational errors is the
fundamental reason for the oscillations. If the expectational errors diminish over
time, the economy will converge to the new steady-state as it is the case under
perfect foresight. Otherwise, we may observe explosive paths of the economy.
Now, one can perfectly explain the evolution of actual variables in the subse-
quent periods. Recall that households own capital. Given the rise in the rental
rate of capital in the initial period, the expectational error in the related learning
rule (16)-(17) is positive. Thus, the expected value of the rental rate of capital
increases after the update in the subsequent period. This causes households to
save even more and to consume even less compared to the previous period. Thus,
next periods capital stock will be larger and the actual rental-rate of capital will
be lower than in the current period.
In analogy, households supply labour and given the fall of the real wage in
the initial period, the expectational error in the related learning rule (16)-(17) is
negative. Thus, the expected value of the real wage decreases after the update
in the subsequent period. The lower expected real wage causes households to
supply even more labour compared to the previous period.
Notice that these movements in actual variables continue until the signs of
the expectational errors change. Then the movements of actual variables proceed
in the opposite directions. Furthermore, the evolution of these variables in turn
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explains the evolution of all remaining variables such as output.
In addition, inspection of (10) and (26) makes clear that the oscillations are
not caused by the assumption of elastic labour supply. When we assume inelastic
labour supply the initial drop in consumption is simply larger as in the case of
elastic labour supply. The result of the sensitivity analysis below underlines this
fact.
In order to sum up, under learning an anticipated tax change will cause ini-
tial responses in non-predetermined variables. These responses inevitably cause
expectational errors. The magnitude of the expectational errors is related to the
model assumptions such as (in-)elastic labour supply, the type of the tax that
is changed, the magnitude of the tax change or the implementation date. Small
expectational errors mean fast convergence and small oscillations, while large
expectational errors result in large oscillations or even divergence. With regard
to the example in Figure 1, we conclude that it is not the different assumption
about labour supply per se that causes the differences in the dynamics, but the
fact that expectational errors in the two cases are different.
3.2. Sensitivity Analysis
Compared to the previous literature on welfare evaluation of tax reforms, our
learning approach introduces two additional structural parameters. One is γ, the
gain parameter and a second one is Tp, the period, in which the pre-announced
tax change becomes effective. Therefore, we are interested in how these two
parameters affect the dynamic properties of the model.
3.2.1. Sensitivity Analysis for the Gain Parameter
No matter what calibration, one usually has to choose a gain parameter γ
in the adaptive learning literature. In this subsection we would therefore like
20
to illustrate the consequences of different choices of the gain parameter. The
sole empirical estimate we are aware of is provided by Milani (2007, p.2074) for
quarterly frequency and is γ = 0.0183. This number indicates that agents use
approximately 1/γ ≈ 55 quarters of data. But a reason to be cautious to use
the estimate of Milani (2007, p.2074) is that it is based on a data set containing
output, inflation and the nominal interest rate, whereas in our setting agents
forecast the rental rate of capital and the real wage. Next, Milani (2007, p.2074)
mentions that for constant gain learning a range of γ ∈ [0.01, 0.03] is commonly
used. Evans and Honkapohja (2009, p.154) note a range of γ ∈ [0.01, 0.06] as
known estimates.
Below we will present sensitivity of the dynamics under learning for γ ∈
{0.01, 0.02, 0.05, 0.08, 0.10}. We do so for the original numerical analysis of Evans
et al. (2009, p.943ff.) (L¯ = 1.00, η = 0.00), as in this case, there is inelastic labour
supply and we can focus solely on the possible fluctuations introduced by varying
the gain parameter γ. Note that the two thick lines in Figures 2(a) and 2(b)
exactly replicate the Figures 8 and 9 in Evans et al. (2009, p.943ff.).
In Figure 2(a) we observe that the smaller the gain γ, the smaller the increase
in consumption until the period of the tax change Tp (after the initial drop). Fur-
thermore, as we recognize from Figure 2(b), the smaller the gain γ, the larger the
increase in capital accumulation until the period of the tax change Tp. However,
in both Figure 2(a) and 2(b), we observe that with decreasing γ the dynamics
fluctuate around the steady-state with increasing amplitude and it takes an in-
creasing number of periods to converge to the steady-state. These observations
are partly at odds with what Evans and Honkapohja (2001, p.332) report: “a
larger gain is better at tracking changes but at the cost of a larger variance”. In
our case it holds, that, the smaller the gain, the larger the volatility.
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Figure 2: Consumption (a) and capital (b) dynamics under learning and perfect
foresight with inelastic labour supply as in Evans et al. (2009, p.943ff.)
for alternating values of γ. The dotted horizontal line indicates the
(new) steady state, the dotted vertical line indicates period Tp.
Inspection of the learning rule (16)-(17) explains this fact. In the alternative
representation the term (1 − γ)i one can observe that the smaller the gain, the
stronger the discounting of past data. Thus, the more unimportant is past data
for agents expectation formation. One can also think of this as agents having more
confidence in their initial expectations. But, if these expectations are wrong, and
they have to be once a tax change occurs, then they have bigger errors over time
and need longer to learn the new steady-state.
Summing up, we find that for the parameter range considered in this sensi-
tivity analysis, the choice of the gain parameter γ is not crucial for the shape of
the dynamic response.
3.2.2. Sensitivity Analysis for the Implementation Date
Another issue that may be of interest is the implementation date Tp. As men-
tioned above a tax policy change that is going to be effective in 20 years time
appears to be unrealistic from our point of view. Therefore, we examine sensi-
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tivity of dynamics under learning for various implementation dates, in particular
Tp ∈ {3, 10, 20}. Figures 3(a) and 3(b) below display the results.
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Figure 3: Consumption (a) and capital (b) dynamics under learning with inelastic
labour supply as in Evans et al. (2009, p.943ff.) for alternating values
of Tp. The dotted horizontal line indicates the (new) steady state, the
dotted vertical line indicates period Tp = 20.
In Figure 3(a) we observe that the shorter the distance between the announce-
ment date and implementation date of the tax change, the higher the initial drop
in consumption and the lower the increase in consumption until the implemen-
tation date thereafter. Focusing on capital, in Figure 3(b) we observe that with
decreasing distance between the announcement date and implementation date of
the tax change, the level that capital reaches until the implementation date, is
also lower. Finally, for implementation in three years time, i.e. Tp = 3, learning
dynamics are not significantly different from Tp ∈ {10, 20}, but lower in scale.
Overall, we observe that the shorter the distance between announcement date
and implementation date of the tax change, the earlier the learning dynamics ap-
proach the steady-state, but, at least for the parameter range considered herein,
the nature of dynamics is not seriously affected.
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Thus, we learn that in the subsequent numerical analysis, next to the elasticity
of labour supply η (and the commonly known candidate parameters β and δ),
the choice of the gain parameter γ as well as the implementation date Tp may
also be crucial in achieving convergence on the one hand and determining the
magnitude of volatility of the dynamics on the other hand. But these choices
may not affect the general nature of the dynamics. Furthermore, our experience
with β and δ suggests that they strongly affect the scale of results, next to their
impact on convergence.
In order to summarize, there are three important insights from the analysis
above. First, there are at least qualitative differences between the case of inelas-
tic labour supply (η = 0) and elastic labour supply (η > 0). Therefore, if one
regards the latter assumption as more realistic, a model that allows for elastic
labour supply is a more appropriate framework to study anticipated fiscal policy
under learning. Second, our sensitivity analysis suggests that the choice of the
gain parameter γ and the implementation date Tp does not affect the nature of
transition paths so we consider ourselves free to choose any of the values consid-
ered in the sensitivity analysis.13 Finally and most notably, we observed at least
a qualitative difference in the dynamics under learning compared to the dynamics
under perfect foresight. The former appear to be much more volatile than the
latter. This stylized fact, from our point of view, justifies the quantification and
comparison of welfare cost of anticipated fiscal policy reforms under learning and
under perfect foresight. In order to be able to mimic, at least to some extent,
a realistic fiscal policy reform, we will introduce distortionary taxes. Before we
look at complex fiscal policy reforms, we qualitatively inspect isolated changes in
13In particular, in the subsequent analysis, we will choose γ = 0.08 and Tp = 8, which will
correspond to 8 quarters.
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distortionary taxes and the resulting dynamics for each type of tax. Thereafter,
we analyze more sophisticated fiscal policy reforms with regard to their welfare
costs in a realistic calibration.
4. The Case of Distortionary Taxation
After the base case of lump-sum taxation, we now study the case of distor-
tionary taxes. In the remainder, we will assume elastic labour supply. We first
derive the dynamic paths of the economy in presence of multiple types of taxes.14
Thereafter, we evaluate some specific tax reforms with regard to welfare, given
our suggested calibration.
Let us now assume that τ ct , τ
l
t , τ
k
t ∈ [0, 1] and τt 6= 0 for all t. The Euler
equation (8) now changes to
c−1t = β(c
p
t+1(t))
−1
[
(1 + τ ct )
(1 + τ c,et+1(t))
]
[(1− δ) + (1− τ k,et+1(t))ret+1(t)]
and forward substitution of this expression yields
cpt+j(t) = β
jDk,et,t+j(t)
[
(1 + τ ct )
(1 + τ c,et+j(t))
]
ct, (28)
where we define Dk,et,t+j(t) ≡ Πji=1[(1−δ)+(1−τ k,et+i(t))ret+i(t)]. Furthermore, notice
that the consumption leisure trade-off is now given by (10). Given the adequate
14Note that in an earlier version of this paper we also presented the dynamics for the case
where only one type of distortionary taxation is present. Each, labour income tax, capital
income tax or consumption tax was raised by 10%. For the labour income tax and capital
income tax we found that in both cases there are again oscillations. Compared to the lump-
sum case the magnitude is much larger and the it takes more time for convergence to the new
steady-state. The dynamics of the consumption tax reform coincide for perfect foresight and
learning. This result depends on our utility specification with regard to consumption, that is
log-utility.
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transversality condition for capital
lim
T 7→∞
(
Dk,et,t+T (t)
)−1
kpt+T+1(t) = 0, (29)
the inter-temporal budget constraint of the consumer is
(1 + τ ct )ct +
∞∑
j=1
1
Dk,et,t+j(t)
(1 + τ c,et+j(t))c
p
t+j(t) = [(1− δ) + (1− τ kt )rt]kt
+(1− τ lt )wtnt − τt
+
∞∑
j=1
1
Dk,et,t+j(t)
[(1− τ l,et+j(t))wet+j(t)npt+j(t)− τ et+j(t)],
which by the virtue of (28) as well as (10) yields
(1 + η)
(1− β)(1 + τ
c
t )ct = [(1− δ) + (1− τ kt )rt]kt + (1− τ lt )wtL¯− τt
+
∞∑
j=1
1
Dk,et,t+j(t)
[(1− τ l,et+j(t))wet+j(t)L¯− τ et+j(t)]
= [(1− δ) + (1− τ kt )rt]kt + (1− τ lt )wtL¯− τt
+
∞∑
j=1
1
Dk,et,t+j(t)
[wet+j(t)L¯− τ l,et+j(t)wet+j(t)L¯− τ et+j(t)]
= [(1− δ) + (1− τ kt )rt]kt + (1− τ lt )wtL¯− τt
+SW2 − ST2 − ST3. (30)
For firms nothing changes compared to the base case in Section 3. Finally govern-
ment now faces the constraint (15) in each period t. The economy-wide resource
constraint is again given by (1).
We now consider the scenario of a permanent (simultaneous) change in (some
of the) taxes at some point in time Tp. The dynamics under perfect foresight are
again standard. Under learning we again follow the approach Evans et al. (2009,
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p.943ff.). The infinite sum on the right-hand side of (30) is
SW2 =
∞∑
j=1
1
Dk,et,t+j(t)
wet+j(t)L¯. (31)
Given (16) and (17), for 1 ≤ t < Tp we calculate15
SW2 =
we(t)L¯
[(1− τ k0 )re(t)− δ]
+ we(t)L¯×
[
[(1− δ) + (1− τ k1 )re(t)]t−Tp
1− [(1− δ) + (1− τ k1 )re(t)]−1
− [(1− δ) + (1− τ
k
0 )r
e(t)]t−Tp
1− [(1− δ) + (1− τ k0 )re(t)]−1
]
(32)
and for t ≥ Tp we calculate
SW2 =
we(t)L¯
[(1− τ k1 )re(t)− δ]
. (33)
ST2 on the right-hand side of (30) is
ST2 =
∞∑
j=1
1
Dk,et,t+j(t)
τ l,et+j(t)w
e
t+j(t)L¯. (34)
Given (16) and (17), for 1 ≤ t < Tp we calculate16
ST2 =
τ l0 w
e(t)L¯
[(1− τ k0 )re(t)− δ]
+ we(t)L¯×
[
τ l1 [(1− δ) + (1− τ k1 )re(t)]t−Tp
1− [(1− δ) + (1− τ k1 )re(t)]−1
− τ
l
0 [(1− δ) + (1− τ k0 )re(t)]t−Tp
1− [(1− δ) + (1− τ k0 )re(t)]−1
]
(35)
15See Appendix A.3 for details on derivations of SW2.
16See appendices A.4 and A.5 for the details on derivations of ST2 and ST3.
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and for t ≥ Tp we calculate
ST2 =
τ l1 w
e(t)L¯
[(1− τ k1 )re(t)− δ]
. (36)
Finally, ST3 on the right-hand side of (30) is
ST3 =
∞∑
j=1
1
Dk,et,t+j(t)
τ et+j(t). (37)
Given (16) and (17), for 1 ≤ t < Tp we calculate
ST3 =
τ0
[(1− τ k0 )re(t)− δ]
+ [
[(1− δ) + (1− τ k1 )re(t)]t−Tp
1− [(1− δ) + (1− τ k1 )re(t)]−1
τ1
− [(1− δ) + (1− τ
k
0 )r
e(t)]t−Tp
1− [(1− δ) + (1− τ k0 )re(t)]−1
τ0 ] (38)
and for t ≥ Tp we calculate
ST3 =
τ1
[(1− τ k1 )re(t)− δ]
. (39)
Given (30) we can then compute the dynamics responses for consumption and
the other endogenous variables as before. Now, we will conduct several policy
experiments numerically and compute welfare measures following the approach
of Cooley and Hansen (1992, p.301ff.).17 Intuitively speaking, we compute the
increase in consumption that an individual would require to be as well off as under
the equilibrium allocation without taxes. We express that number in percentage
of output. First, we will do so for our initial choice of tax levels (see line 1 in
Table 3 below). Thereafter, we carry out policy reforms, where we change taxes
17We detail the computation in Appendix B.
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in a certain way and each time recalculate welfare measure both for learning and
perfect foresight. As a result we can then compare the welfare implications for a
tax change under perfect foresight against the case under learning. Note that we
use the measure of Cooley and Hansen (1992, p.301ff.) for the transition paths.
We do so because their measure for static comparison would lead to the same
number for perfect foresight and learning, as in both cases the initial and new
steady-states are identical.
An additional parameter needs to be chosen. That is the evaluation horizon
T . Cooley and Hansen (1992, p.301ff.) choose a horizon T ≥ 2000 and give no
further detail on the motivation of that choice. Garcia-Mila` et al. (2010) use
T = 200 and give no motivation either. We will choose the latter in our welfare
evaluations as a time span of 200 quarters or 50 years respectively appears to be
more realistic from our point of view. For the series of experiments in Table 3
below, our calibration of the model is according to Table 2 below.
Insert Table 2 here.
We choose the initial tax rates to be τ0 = 0.0000, τ
l
0 = 0.2300, τ
k
0 = 0.5000 and
τ c0 = 0.0500. These non-zero tax rates lead to distortions. The first row in Table
3 reveals the welfare loss between the steady-state of the economy without taxes
and the steady-state of the economy with our initially chosen tax rates amounts
to 73.72%. This number tells us the change in consumption (in percentage of
output) which is required so that households in the economy with initial tax
levels are as well off as in the case with zero taxes is 73.72%. Be aware that Table
3 also indicates that without taxes our calibration yields a first best steady-state
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employment of nFB = 0.4024, which implies 9.66 hours. With the initial taxes in
place, the steady-state employment is n0 = 0.4326, which implies 10.38 hours.
Now we assume a credible pre-announced permanent tax reform that favours
capital accumulation, i.e. we lower the capital income tax to a level of τ k1 =
0.2500. As suggested by Judd (1987), Lucas (1990) and Cooley and Hansen
(1992) this is expected to reduce the welfare costs of distortionary taxation. In
each experiment reported lines 2 to 4 in Table 3 below, one of the other tax
instruments, τ•, τ l• or τ
c
• will be raised to a level that ensures that the periodic
tax revenue in the new steady-state is the same as in the initial steady-state.18
The second row of Table 3 indicates that compensating the cut in the capital
income tax to τ k1 by an increase in the labour income tax to τ
l
1 leads to a welfare
improvement under perfect foresight as well as under learning as both welfare
measures decrease. But the numbers also reveal that the magnitude of the im-
provement differs. Whereas under learning the welfare measure goes down from
73.72% to 72.12%, under perfect foresight it decreases much more to 64.47%.19
We can also observe that the new steady-state employment n1 is lower than the
initial steady-state employment n0.
The pattern just described is also true, if we compensate the cut in τ k• by an
increase in τ c• or τ• as the third and fourth row in Table 3 indicate. It is noteworthy
18Note, that as long as the dynamics under learning and perfect foresight differ, one is not
able to equalize present values of tax revenues under learning and perfect foresight to the present
value of tax revenues in the initial steady-state by manipulating tax rates in the same way. This
approach was used in the analysis of Cooley and Hansen (1992) for perfect foresight only, but
is not feasible in our case. In addition, we believe that keeping present values constant is not
the kind of fiscal policy change that governments conduct in reality. Moreover, we believe that
our comparison of welfare costs under learning to welfare costs under perfect foresight is valid
even without equalizing present values of the tax revenue.
19We would like to emphasize that we set the rate of depreciation to δ = 0 in order to
achieve convergence for the dynamics under learning. That might be the reason, why the scale
of W both under learning and perfect foresight is approximately twice the scale as the results
in Cooley and Hansen (1992).
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that using the the lump-sum tax to compensate for the cut in the capital income
tax yields the largest welfare improvement and keeps steady-state employment
at the highest level independent of the assumption about expectations.
Thus, experiments 2 to 4 indicate that the resulting welfare improvements of
an anticipated tax reform might be much smaller in magnitude under learning
compared to its improvements under perfect foresight.
Insert Table 3 here.
5. Conclusion
We demonstrate that the responses to anticipated permanent tax changes
when agents learn are remarkably different compared to their counterparts under
perfect foresight. The dynamics under learning appear to oscillate around the
steady-state to which they converge slowly. Thus, there is more volatility under
learning.
We argue that the observed oscillations are related to expectational errors.
The expectational errors are caused by the anticipated permanent tax change.
The persistence of the expectational error in the learning rule of the agents is the
fundamental reason for the oscillations.
Moreover, sensitivity analyses show that a smaller gain parameter leads to
higher volatility in our framework. This result is at odds with conventional
wisdom about the link between the gain parameter and the dynamic responses
in the learning literature.
In the subsequent analysis we derive the dynamics in the presence of multiple
tax instruments. Policy experiments in this set-up indicate that the magnitude
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of welfare improvements due to the tax reform considered herein appears to be
substantially lower under the assumption of learning compared to the case of
perfect foresight. The reason may be the oscillatory behaviour of the dynamics
under learning.
Form our point of view these results raise two major issues. First, oscilla-
tory dynamic responses to exogenous shocks are rarely found in actual economic
data. This fact questions the suitability of the model herein for policy analysis.
Second, given that this model would be suitable for policy analysis, our results
indicate that permanent tax changes may lead to lower welfare improvements
under learning compared to perfect foresight.
We believe that future research in this area needs to come up with convincing
empirical evidence on whether or how agents learn about fiscal policy. In addition,
we also need to clarify from actual economic data, how the dynamic responses to
anticipated permanent tax changes look like. Are they smooth or oscillatory?
With regard to theoretical considerations, it would also be desirable to derive
a version of the model that allows for changing different tax rates at different
points in time and therefore allows for public debt accumulation. But this task
is beyond the focus of this paper and we aim to pursue that idea in subsequent
research.
Furthermore, we think that perfect foresight and the implied once and for all
choices of agents on the one hand and learning which implies periodic revision of
current and future choices of agents on the other hand are extreme cases. One
could also imagine agents that use adaptive learning, but infrequently and with
differing interval length update their expectations and revise their current and
future choices. Alternatively, agents randomly receive a signal to update their
expectations.
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In addition, more sophisticated computational methods may allow to calibrate
the rate of depreciation different from zero or more realistic values of the elasticity
of labour supply and still ensure convergence for the dynamics under learning on
the other side. This could facilitate numerical results that are directly comparable
to the existing literature in public finance.
A. Model Derivations
A.1. Timing
We believe that the understanding of the timing is crucial to follow the deriva-
tions. For time periods indexed by t, discounting periods indexed by j, and an
implementation date Tp announced in t = 1 and T ≡ Tp− t denoting the number
of periods until Tp we got the following picture:
t = 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, 6, ...
j = 0, 1, 2, 3, 4, 5, ...
T ≡ Tp − t = 4, 3, 2, 1, 0,−1, ...,
thus for the infinite sum over index j
T−1∑
j=1
{•}+
∞∑
j=T
{•} (A.1.1)
from period t = 1 perspective, given exemplary Tp = 5 on the line 1 ≤ t ≤ Tp−1,
until j = 3 = T − 1 we have the old tax rate. Furthermore, on the line t ≥ Tp
from j = 4 = T onwards we have the new tax rate. Equivalently for the infinite
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sum
T−2∑
j=0
{•}+
∞∑
j=T−1
{•} (A.1.2)
from period t = 1 perspective, given exemplary Tp = 5 on the line 1 ≤ t ≤ Tp−1,
until j = 2 = T − 2 we have the old tax rate. Furthermore, on the line t ≥ Tp
from j = 3 = T − 1 onwards we have the new tax. This allows us later on to
replace T with Tp − t for 1 ≤ t ≤ Tp − 1 and T − 1 with 0 for t ≥ Tp.
A.2. Derivation of ST1
Here we want to illustrate the methodology we apply in all derivations under
learning for the example of ST1. Starting from
ST1 =
∞∑
j=1
1
Det,t+j(t)
τ et+j(t)
we split this infinite sum into
ST1 =
[
T−1∑
j=1
1
Det,t+j(t)
τ0 +
∞∑
j=T
1
Det,t+j(t)
τ1
]
.
Next we go back to the definition of Det,t+j(t). Given the learning rules (16) and
(17) we get
Det,t+j(t) = Π
j
i=1 [(1− δ) + re(t)] = [(1− δ) + re(t)]j . (A.2.1)
Consequently we get
ST1 =
[
T−1∑
j=1
(
[(1− δ) + re(t)]−1)j τ0 + ∞∑
j=T
(
[(1− δ) + re(t)]−1)j τ1] ,
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or
ST1 = [(1− δ) + re(t)]−1 ×
[
T−2∑
j=0
(
[(1− δ) + re(t)]−1)j τ0 + ∞∑
j=T−1
(
[(1− δ) + re(t)]−1)j τ1] .
Given the property of a finite geometric series
∑n
j=m f
j = f
n+1−fm
f−1 for some
constant f , we get
ST1 = [(1− δ) + re(t)]−1 ×
[(
[(1− δ) + re(t)]1−T − 1
[(1− δ) + re(t)]−1 − 1
)
τ0 +
(
− [(1− δ) + re(t)]1−T
[(1− δ) + re(t)]−1 − 1
)
τ1
]
,
which can be rewritten as
ST1 =
τ0
re(t)− δ +
(τ1 − τ0)
[(1− δ) + re(t)]
[(1− δ) + re(t)]1−T
1− [(1− δ) + re(t)]−1 . (A.2.2)
Now, considering the timing outlined in Appendix A.1 above, for 1 ≤ t ≤ Tp − 1
we plug in Tp − t for T and get (24)
ST1 =
τ0
re(t)− δ + (τ1 − τ0)
[(1− δ) + re(t)]t−Tp
1− [(1− δ) + re(t)]−1 , (A.2.3)
and for t ≥ Tp we have T − 1 = 0, thus we get (25)
ST1 =
τ1
re(t)− δ . (A.2.4)
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A.3. Derivation of SW2
We start from (31)
SW2 =
∞∑
j=1
1
Dk,et,t+j(t)
wet+j(t)L¯.
Next, we recall the definition of Dk,et,t+j(t). Given the learning rules (16) and (17)
we get
Dk,et,t+j(t) = Π
j
i=1
[
(1− δ) + (1− τ k0 )re(t)
]
=
[
(1− δ) + (1− τ k0 )re(t)
]j
(A.3.1)
for τ k,et+j(t) = τ
k
0 and
Dk,et,t+j(t) = Π
j
i=1
[
(1− δ) + (1− τ k1 )re(t)
]
=
[
(1− δ) + (1− τ k1 )re(t)
]j
(A.3.2)
for τ k,et+j(t) = τ
k
1 . Thereafter, we split this infinite sum into
SW2 = L¯
[
T−1∑
j=1
1
Dk,et,t+j(t)
we(t) +
∞∑
j=T
1
Dk,et,t+j(t)
we(t)
]
= L¯[
T−1∑
j=1
(
[
(1− δ) + (1− τ k0 )re(t)
]j
)−1we(t) +
∞∑
j=T
(
[
(1− δ) + (1− τ k1 )re(t)
]j
)−1we(t) ],
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or
SW2 =
we(t)L¯[
(1− δ) + (1− τ k0 )re(t)
] T−2∑
j=0
([
(1− δ) + (1− τ k0 )re(t)
]−1)j
+
we(t)L¯[
(1− δ) + (1− τ k1 )re(t)
] ∞∑
j=T−1
([
(1− δ) + (1− τ k1 )re(t)
]−1)j
.
As in Section A.2 above, we exploit the properties of geometric series and derive
SW2 =
we(t)L¯[
(1− δ) + (1− τ k0 )re(t)
] (1− [(1− δ) + (1− τ k0 )re(t)]1−T
1− [(1− δ) + (1− τ k0 )re(t)]−1
)
+
we(t)L¯[
(1− δ) + (1− τ k1 )re(t)
] ( [(1− δ) + (1− τ k1 )re(t)]1−T
1− [(1− δ) + (1− τ k1 )re(t)]−1
)
.
Now we get back to the timing outlined in Appendix A.1 above, for 1 ≤ t ≤ Tp−1
we plug in Tp − t for T and get (32)
SW2 =
we(t)L¯
[(1− τ k0 )re(t)− δ]
+ we(t)L¯×
[
[(1− δ) + (1− τ k1 )re(t)]t−Tp
1− [(1− δ) + (1− τ k1 )re(t)]−1
− [(1− δ) + (1− τ
k
0 )r
e(t)]t−Tp
1− [(1− δ) + (1− τ k0 )re(t)]−1
]
(A.3.3)
and for t ≥ Tp we have T − 1 = 0, thus we get (33)
SW2 =
we(t)L¯
[(1− τ k1 )re(t)− δ]
. (A.3.4)
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A.4. Derivation of ST2
Starting from (34)
ST2 =
∞∑
j=1
1
Dk,et,t+j(t)
τ l,et+j(t)w
e
t+j(t)L¯
for (A.3.1) and (A.3.2) and τ l,et+j(t) is either given by τ
l
0 or τ
l
1, we may once more
split the infinite sum into
ST2 = w
e(t)L¯×
[
T−1∑
j=1
([
(1− δ) + (1− τ k0 )re(t)
]j)−1
τ l0
+
∞∑
j=T
([
(1− δ) + (1− τ k1 )re(t)
]j)−1
τ l1 ],
or
ST2 =
τ l0 w
e(t)L¯[
(1− δ) + (1− τ k0 )re(t)
] T−2∑
j=0
([
(1− δ) + (1− τ k0 )re(t)
]−1)j
+
τ l1 w
e(t)L¯[
(1− δ) + (1− τ k1 )re(t)
] ∞∑
j=T−1
([
(1− δ) + (1− τ k1 )re(t)
]−1)j
.
Now, the properties of the geometric series allow us to rewrite this as
ST2 =
τ l0 w
e(t)L¯[
(1− δ) + (1− τ k0 )re(t)
] ([(1− δ) + (1− τ k0 )re(t)]1−T − 1[
(1− δ) + (1− τ k0 )re(t)
]−1 − 1
)
+
τ l1 w
e(t)L¯[
(1− δ) + (1− τ k1 )re(t)
] (− [(1− δ) + (1− τ k1 )re(t)]1−T[
(1− δ) + (1− τ k1 )re(t)
]−1 − 1
)
.
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For the timing outlined in Appendix A.1 above, for 1 ≤ t ≤ Tp − 1 we plug in
Tp − t for T and get (35)
ST2 =
τ l0 w
e(t)L¯
[(1− τ k0 )re(t)− δ]
+ we(t)L¯×
[
τ l1 [(1− δ) + (1− τ k1 )re(t)]t−Tp
1− [(1− δ) + (1− τ k1 )re(t)]−1
− τ
l
0 [(1− δ) + (1− τ k0 )re(t)]t−Tp
1− [(1− δ) + (1− τ k0 )re(t)]−1
]
(A.4.1)
and for t ≥ Tp we have T − 1 = 0, thus we get (36)
ST2 =
τ l1 w
e(t)L¯
[(1− τ k1 )re(t)− δ]
. (A.4.2)
A.5. Derivation of ST3
Starting from (37)
ST3 =
∞∑
j=1
1
Dk,et,t+j(t)
τ et+j(t)
given (A.3.1) and (A.3.2) are true and τ et+j(t) is either τ0 or τ1, we again split the
infinite sum into
ST3 = [
T−1∑
j=1
([
(1− δ) + (1− τ k0 )re(t)
]j)−1
τ0
+
∞∑
j=T
([
(1− δ) + (1− τ k1 )re(t)
]j)−1
τ1 ],
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or
ST3 =
[
(1− δ) + (1− τ k0 )re(t)
]−1 [T−2∑
j=0
([
(1− δ) + (1− τ k0 )re(t)
]−1)j
τ0
]
+
[
(1− δ) + (1− τ k1 )re(t)
]−1 [ ∞∑
j=T−1
([
(1− δ) + (1− τ k1 )re(t)
]−1)j
τ1
]
.
Given the properties of geometric series we can rewrite the latter as
ST3 =
[
(1− δ) + (1− τ k0 )re(t)
]−1([(1− δ) + (1− τ k0 )re(t)]1−T − 1[
(1− δ) + (1− τ k0 )re(t)
]−1 − 1 τ0
)
+
[
(1− δ) + (1− τ k1 )re(t)
]−1(− [(1− δ) + (1− τ k1 )re(t)]1−T[
(1− δ) + (1− τ k1 )re(t)
]−1 − 1τ1
)
.
Now given the timing outlined in Appendix A.1 above, for 1 ≤ t ≤ Tp − 1 we
plug in Tp − t for T and get (38)
ST3 =
τ0
[(1− τ k0 )re(t)− δ]
+[
[(1− δ) + (1− τ k1 )re(t)]t−Tp
1− [(1− δ) + (1− τ k1 )re(t)]−1
τ1
− [(1− δ) + (1− τ
k
0 )r
e(t)]t−Tp
1− [(1− δ) + (1− τ k0 )re(t)]−1
τ0 ] (A.5.1)
and for t ≥ Tp we have T − 1 = 0, thus we get (39)
ST3 =
τ1
[(1− τ k1 )re(t)− δ]
. (A.5.2)
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B. Computing Welfare Changes
B.1. Comparative Statics
We follow the approach of Cooley and Hansen (1992, p.301ff.) based on Lucas
(1990). Their measure of welfare change for a given policy change is derived by
solving
U0 = log[c1(1 + x
•)] + η log[1− n1] (B.1.1)
for x in our case.20 U0 is the utility a household obtains in the steady-state
without any tax and c1 and n1 are the values of consumption and employment
at the new steady-state after the tax change either under perfect foresight or
learning. It follows that
x• =
exp(U0)
c1(1− n1)η − 1. (B.1.2)
Thus, in general, we need to solve for x for the perfect foresight dynamics and
another x∗ for the dynamics under learning.21 Given x• we can calculate
W = 4C
y1
=
x•c1
y1
, (B.1.3)
where 4C is the restoration value of consumption, which in our case may be
interpreted as the total change in consumption required to restore a household
to the level of utility obtained under the allocation associated with zero taxes.
y1 is the level of output at the new steady-state.
20x• is either x under perfect foresight or x∗ under learning.
21Of course we are aware that this must yield the same x = x∗ both under perfect-foresight
and under learning, but this number may be useful to compare different policy experiments.
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B.2. Transition Measure
Again we follow the approach of Cooley and Hansen (1992, p.301ff.) based on
Lucas (1990). Their measure of welfare change accounting for transition given a
policy change is derived by solving
T∑
t=1
βt {log[ct(1 + x•)] + η log[1− nt]− U0} != 0 (B.2.1)
for x under perfect foresight and x∗ under learning. T is the terminal period, ct
is period t consumption either under perfect foresight or learning and yt is period
t output either under perfect foresight or learning.
x• =
 exp (U0 [β1 + ...+ βT ])(
cβ
1
1 ... c
βT
T
)
×
[
(1− n1)ηβ1 ... (1− nT )ηβT
]
 1[β1+...+βT ] − 1.
x• =
 exp
(
U0
∑T
t=1 β
t
)
ΠTt=1c
βt
t × ΠTt=1 (1− nt)ηβ
t

1∑T
t=1 β
t
− 1. (B.2.2)
Given x• we can calculate
W• =
∑T
t=1 β
t {xct}∑T
t=1 β
t {yt}
, (B.2.3)
which will be reported asW for the perfect foresight dynamics and asW∗ for the
dynamics under learning.
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Figure Legends
Figure 1: Consumption and capital dynamics under learning and perfect foresight
for a change in lump-sum tax. Consumption (a) and capital (b) dynamics under
learning (solid curve) and perfect foresight (dashed curve) with inelastic labour
supply as in Evans et al. (2009, p.943ff.) as well as consumption (c) and capital
(d) dynamics under learning (solid curve) and perfect foresight (dashed curve)
with elastic labour supply. The dotted horizontal line indicates the (new) steady
state, the dotted vertical line indicates period Tp.
Figure 2: Sensitivity analysis for consumption and capital dynamics under learn-
ing and perfect foresight with regard to the gain parameter. Consumption (a) and
capital (b) dynamics under learning and perfect foresight with inelastic labour
supply as in Evans et al. (2009, p.943ff.) for alternating values of γ. The dotted
horizontal line indicates the (new) steady state, the dotted vertical line indicates
period Tp.
Figure 3: Sensitivity analysis for consumption and capital dynamics under learn-
ing and perfect foresight with regard to the implementation date. Consumption
(a) and capital (b) dynamics under learning with inelastic labour supply as in
Evans et al. (2009, p.943ff.) for alternating values of Tp. The dotted horizontal
line indicates the (new) steady state, the dotted vertical line indicates period
Tp = 20.
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Tables
Parameter Value Parameter Value
A 1.00 δ 0.00
α 0.33 Tp 20
β 0.95 γ 0.10
Table 1: Parameters similar as in Evans et al. (2009, p.945)
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Parameter Value Parameter Value
A 1.00 δ 0.00
α 0.33 Tp 8
β 0.99 γ 0.08
η 0.99 L¯ 1.00
Table 2: Model calibration for policy experiments 1.− 4.
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